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INTRODUCTION
The K. C. Irving case, reaching, as it did, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, is of substantial importance with respect to the effectiveness of 
the monopoly and m erger provisions o f the Combines Investigation Act. In 
a recent Annual Report, the Director of Investigation and Research 
stated:
On November 16, 1976, the Supreme Court o f  Canada handl'd down its 
unanimous decision dismissing the Crown’s appeal against the acquittal in the 
K. C. Irving  case. That decision disposed o f  whatever hopes may have 
remained that the present criminal prohibition o f  mergers could be an 
effective instrument.1
The need for a Supreme Court judgm ent, particularly in a merger 
case, had been prom inent in the thinking o f the administrators of the 
Combines Investigation Act ever since the trial court decisions acquitting 
the defendants in I960 in the Beer2 and Sugar3 cases. A common theme 
in the opinions expressed by Combines officials was that these decisions, 
by requiring a virtual elimination of competition to be illegal, seriously 
weakened the m erger provision o f the Act. The 1960 amendment 
specified that a lessening or likely lessening of competition to the 
detrim ent o f the public in a merger case was proof o f illegality. The 
Beer and Sugar decisions were arrived at under legislation in which 
operation, or likely operation to the detriment of the public, was 
required for illegality. In view of the different provisions, it is somewhat 
surprising that these decisions were as influential in official thinking as 
they evidently were. In any event, the Supreme Court ruling in the
1Canada Bureau o f Competition Policy, Co t imes Investigatum Act, for the year ended March 31, 1978, at 14.
2Regina v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960] O.R. 601 (Ont. H.C.).
3Regina v. British Columbut Sugar Refining Company Limited et aL (1961), 129 C.C.C. 7 (Man. Q.B.).
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Irving case, which involved both a monopoly and a m erger charge based 
on the 1960 Act, has provided what can probably be considered an 
authoritative ruling on the existing legislation.4
It is not the intent of this article to assess the importance of the 
Irving decision for merger and monopoly policy in Canada. Neither is it 
the purpose o f this article to examine the judgm ents o f the three courts 
involved in the case.5 Instead, an attempt will be made to demonstrate 
that an issue o f substantial significance to the public interest was dealt 
with in what can only be termed an essentially sterile manner. The result 
was that the underlying public interest issues were never effectively 
tackled. The failure of the case to come to grips with the issues of 
deepest concern stems from the fact that, given the criminal nature of 
Canadian monopoly and merger legislation, the task of the Crown was 
to satisfy the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime of 
assisting in the formation or operation o f a monopoly and merger had 
been committed. The interpretations assigned to the key phrases in the 
legislation in previous judgments were all important. As a result, 
essential public interest, or public policy questions, though raised by the 
Crown in the Trial Court as well as in its submission to the Supreme 
Court, were never central to any decision. Thus an issue with a 
substantial public interest content was transformed into a narrowly legal 
question through the very process whereby a decision was reached.
Involving, as it did, the newspaper industry, the Irving case raised 
matters o f particular public concern, extending beyond those typically 
present in a Combines Investigation Act case. The public interest aspects of 
the matter were sharpened by the extensive holdings o f K. C. Irving 
Ltd. in other sectors o f the New Brunswick economy. The outcome of 
the case, in revealing the inadequacy o f the present Combines Act, 
demonstrates the need for new legislation, involving a new’ approach, to 
cope with the problem of mergers in Canada; this demonstration of the 
weakness o f the existing law may be the most important contribution of 
the case to merger policy in Canada. As well, questions are suggested 
relating to the particular public interest matters present in a newspaper 
m erger case, and the possible need for specific treatment of such 
mergers.
4lt should, however, be noted that the post-1960 merger charge foundered with the Court of Appeal’s 
finding that there had been no lessening or likely lessening o f competition, a finding of fact accepted by 
the Supreme Court, so that an essential component o f  illegality was absent. That being the case, the 
question arises as to how authoritative will be the Supreme Court’s decision with respect to merger 
charges in which a lessening, or likely lessening, of competition is established. T he meaning to be 
attached to the key phrase "lesien competition to the detrim ent o f the public" did not, as such, require 
an interpretation for a decision to be arrived at in the Irving case.
5T he case is discussed by Reschenthaler, G. B., and W. T . Stanbury in "Benign Monopoly: Canadian 
Merger Policy and the K. C. Irving Case”; Can. Bus. LJ. Vol. i, No. 2, Aug. 1977. See also Jones, David 
Phillip, “Trade Regulation", 1978 Ottawa Law Rev. Vol. 10, no. 1, 195-197, and Roberts, R. J., “The 
Death o f Competition Policy, Monopoly, Merger and Regina v. K. C. Irvm g Ltd." U.W.O. Law Rev. 
1976-77. Vol. 15-16.
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The events of the case may be briefly summarized. In the Trial 
Court — the New Brunswick Supreme Court, Q ueen’s Bench Division, 
Robichaud J. brought in verdicts o f guilty against K. C. Irving Limited 
on all four counts, two of which related to the pre-1960 amendment 
period, and two to the post-1960 amendment period.6 In addition to the 
imposition o f fines, Robichaud J. ordered the disposal of the Moncton 
Times and Moncton Transcript, the newspapers acquired by the Irving 
interests in 1948. The Trial Court’s judgm ent was appealed to the 
Appeal Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court and the appeal 
was upheld by a unanimous court; Limerick J. delivered the judgm ent. 
T he Court o f Appeal rejected the Trial Court’s understanding of the 
meaning of public detriment. The Crown then appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Laskin C.J. delivered the unanimous opinion o f the 
Supreme Court in November, 1976. He declared, in effect, that K. C. 
Irving, Limited and the others charged, were not guilty of the 
combination, monopoly and merger charges laid by the Crown.7
THE CROWN’S CASE
The public interest thrust of the Crown’s case was made clear in 
Counsel’s opening remarks to the Trial Court.8 After arguing that a 
daily newspaper had “sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses which 
make it distinguishable from all other products”9 and that the Province 
o f New Brunswick constituted an appropriate geographical market in
•To be more precise. In count one, o f the First case, K. C. Irving Limited, New Brunswick Publishing 
Company Limited, Moncton Publishing Company Limited, and University Press o f New Brunswick 
Limited, were found guilty of a monopoly charge under the Act as amended in 1960. In counts two and 
three, also of the First case, K. C. Irving Limited and New Brupswick Publishing Company Limited were 
found guilty of a combines charge under the Act as it was prior to the 1960 amendment, and University 
Press o f New Brunswick was found not guilty. And in the sole count in the second case, a merger 
charge under the Act as amended in 1960, K. C. Irving Limited was found guilty. K. C. Irving Limited 
acquired control o f New Brunswick Publishing Company Limited in 1944; New Brunswick Publishing 
acquired control o f Moncton Publishing Company Limited in 1948, K. C. Irving Limited acquired 
control o f University Press o f New Brunswick Limited in 1968 (80%) and 1971 (100%). New Brunswick 
Publishing published the two Saint John daily newspapers, the Telegraph Journal and Evening 
Times-Globe. Moncton Publishing published the two Moncton daily newspapers, the Times and 
Transcript, and the University Press o f New Brunswick published the Fredericton Daily Cleaner. It 
should be pointed out that the offence in the post-1960 monopoly charge, and in the pre-1960 charges, 
involved an operation, o r likely operation, to the detriment of the public ; the offence in the post-1960 
merger charge involved a lessening, o r likely lessening, o f competition to the detriment o f the public. 
Despite this presumably important difference in the nature o f the offences alleged, the evidence was. 
with agreement o f counsel, declared applicable to all four charges. As a result, the Trial C-ourt 
judgm ent does not make the differentiation in the meaning to be attributed to public detriment that the 
different wordings of the relevant provisions suggest is warranted.
7T he judgm ent o f the Trial Court is given in U974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45. T he judgm ent o f the Court o f 
Appeal is given in (1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157. T he judgm ent o f the Supreme Court of Canada is given
in (1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) I.
'T h e re  was also what might be called the legal thrust: when competition had been lessened unduly, 
there had been, necessarily, public detriment with no need, consequently, to prove specific instances o f 
detriment.
•In the Supreme Court o f Canada. On appeal from the Court of Appeal for the Province of New 
Brunswick. Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, at 67. The transcript of the trial is contained in Volumes 1 to 6.
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that the newspapers in question “provide a service to the New Brunswick 
readers in that only they, from both a news reporting . . . and . . .  an 
advertising standpoint, can cover in depth the events which are of 
interest — in detail — only to the people o f New Brunswick”10, Crown 
Counsel went on to say:
My lord, the detriment . . . which will be proven in this case, 1 suggest takes its 
genesis in that there must be freedom  o f the press — a freedom — should I 
say for an opportunity o f  diversity o f  ideas."
And quoting from a Report by the Restrictive T rade Practices 
Commission:
T he conduct o f  our affairs in a democratic manner . . .  is dependent upon the 
formation o f  public opinion. If the public . . .  is not enlightened by discussion 
that points out the possible consequences o f  the alternative courses o f  action 
before the community, too many opinions will be ill-informed and 
muddled . . .  If well-informed public opinion is an essential o f  sound public 
policy then the channels through which information flows to the members o f  
the public have an importance which cannot be over-emphasized.12
Crown Counsel stated: “My lord, 1 suggest that is really the nub of 
this case”.13
And continuing,
For better or for worse, my lord, this country and our way o f  life has chosen 
a democratic form o f  government, and that whole form o f  government 
depends on informed public opinion, and public opinion can only be 
informed, I suggest, when there is a diversity o f  news available to it and 
presented to it so that it can make up its mind. Then, my lord, we see that in 
this particular case — in this particular monopoly — the economic interests o f  
one o f  the accused, and the ramifications o f  its other economic holdings . . .  it 
makes the detriment ever more apparent and more serious.14
A substantial part of the case presented by the Crown consisted of 
expert evidence to the effect that in a situation such as existed in New 
Brunswick, where all the English-language daily newspapers were under 
the same ownership, whatever the declared policy of the owner with 
respect to editorial and publishing freedom might be, there would, in 
fact, be a resultant constraint that would inhibit the exercise o f editorial 
autonomy. A major objective of the defence was to establish that the 
publishers and editors o f the Irving-owned newspapers had been free to
,2lbid., at 69. T he quotation is from the Restrictive T rade Practices Commission Report Concerning the 
Productum and Supply o f Newspapers in the City o f Vancouver and Elsewhere in the Province o f British Columbia, 
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exercise their own judgm ent as to editorial policy and news stories to be 
included in their newspapers.15
The expert opinion evidence related to several matters: the role of 
the press in society, the relationship between newspapers, radio and 
television, the economics o f the newspaper industry, and the difference 
between daily and weekly newspapers. The Crown relied heavily on 
expert evidence concerning the relationships between owner, publisher, 
editor and reporter as they affected the selection o f news and the 
content of the paper. The goal was to establish a case as to the likely 
consequence of common ownership. As the case proceeded, it turned 
out that this expert evidence was o f minimal importance. Although 
Robichaud J. was favourably impressed by some of this evidence, 
quoting portions o f it in his judgm ent, it played no part in the reasoning 
that led to his decision. Limerick J., in the Court o f Appeal, said the 
following; “All three [experts] admitted that they had made no study of 
the New Brunswick situation and were unable to say that the facts as 
they existed in New Brunswick followed along the line of their obviously 
biased opinions”. 16 The Supreme Court judgm ent dismissed the evidence 
of these experts with the remark, “They spoke theoretically”.17
Crown Counsel concluded his opening submission to the Trial 
Court thus:
In this particular case we say that the Issue here is so fundamental —  the 
necessity for a well-informed public opinion —  that this is the type of  
detriment which results when a monopoly owns all the daily newspapers in a 
province, such as happens in New Brunswick.18
In his oral argument, at the conclusion of the trial, Crown Counsel 
dealt with the meaning to be attached to the phrase “to the detriment of 
the public” and submitted that the two concepts which appear in the 
combines legislation — “unduly” and “to the public detrim ent” — are 
“synonymous and have exactly the same meaning”.19 Since the judicial
lvThe Trial Court Judge was satisfied that this was, in fac t, the case. In his judgm ent he wrote “In o ther 
words, I find, as a fact, that these newspapers have complete editorial autonomy and the owners have 
never cast over their columns any editorial shadow whatsoever”. (1974), 45 D.1..R. (3d) 45, at 88 (N.B.S.C.).
“ (1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157, at 175. (N.B.S.C., A.D.) (Italics supplied) T he three experts were Claude 
Ryan, Douglas Fisher, and Eric Wells.
1T(1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) I, at 13. (S.C.C.).
**Case on Appeal, Vol. 1, at 70.
" In  the Supreme Court of New Brunswick, Queen's Bench Division, Moncton, New Brunswick, 
December 15, 1972. Oral Argument, at 1621. “Unduly" is the key word in the provisions of the Act 
dealing with conspiracies, combination, agreements and arrangements to "prevent, o r lessen, unduly, 
competition’'; in the monopoly provision the key concept is “operation o r likely operation to the 
detriment or against the interest o f the public"; in the merger provision the reference is to the 
“lessening, or likely lessening of competition to the detriment o r against the interest o f the public". T he 
jurisprudence on “unduly”, which also appeared in the relevant section o f the Criminal Oxide, is much 
more extensive than the jurisprudence on public detriment, as a result o f the greater number of 
conspiracy cases in the history o f the enforcement o f the legislation.
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interpretation o f “unduly” was applicable, it followed that “detrim ents”, 
whether actual or potential, ceased to be important, it being well 
established in the “unduly” cases that the public interest was in the 
preservation of competition, with “benefits” and “detrim ents” from any 
other point o f view irrelevant.
Given his emphasis on the “unduly” precedents, Crown Counsel 
argued that it was not necessary “to get into specific illustrations o f 
detriment — that the mere concentration o f ownership is sufficient — is 
all that you need in order to find a person guilty o f this charge”.20 
Hence, specific detriments become merely examples of the exercise o f 
that monopoly power and are essentially irrelevant to the question of 
guilt. Similarly, the stress on the peculiar importance of newspapers to 
the functioning o f a democratic political system ceases to be central. The 
detriment that stemmed from the very nature of the commodity, so 
much referred to in opening remarks, and so much discussed in the 
actual trial, is of significance only if a specific detrim ent has to be 
proved. In other words, given the way in which the concluding 
argument by the Crown was made, much of the prior material, focussing 
upon the part played by the press in society — a discussion which had 
lent to the case much of its general interest, and a discussion which most 
outside observers would probably agree came to grips with the key 
public interest aspect o f the case — lost its importance. The purely legal 
question arises: has the line between due and undue, between legal and 
illegal, been crossed? The nature o f the commodity allegedly 
monopolized matters not.21
THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
How did each court deal with the “freedom of the press” issue?22
tolbid., at 1657. On the basis of the decision eventually reached in the Irving Case, it appears that for 
the Crown to establish guilt in a merger case, not only must a lessening of competition be established, 
but, as well, specific detriments must be demonstrated.
’ ‘This is not to suggest that the Crown abandoned its emphasis on the importance o f competition in the 
newspaper industry for the proper functioning of a democratic political system. Its argum ent, however, 
that "detriment to the public” was established by proof o f an undue lessening of competition, an 
argument accepted by the Trial Court, in effect deprives the Crown's submission on the particular role 
o f newspapers o f the significance it would otherwise have.
“ Counsel for both defence and Crown stressed “freedom of the press" throughout the trial, but they 
saw it rather differendy. The defence argued that “freedom of the press” implied — or included — the 
right to publish and sell newspapers free o f governmental interference, and the case was seen as an 
attempt by the government to deny to K. C. Irving this particular freedom and therefore a (politically 
motivated) restriction on press freedom. The philosophy of Brigadier Wardell, form er publisher o f the 
Fredericton Daily Gleaner, was cited: T h e  freedom of the press is the freedom to own, edit, print, 
publish and sell a newspaper, without interference o r coercion from any Governments at any level”. 
Case on Appeal, Vol. IV, at 728. T he Crown saw the issue as the availability to the public of a variety of 
independent newspapers. Freedom of the press did not include the right o f a newspaper owner, who 
already had an interest in the publishing o f four newspapers, to purchase yet another one, if that 
newspaper was the sole remaining competition for the newspapers already owned. Freedom of the press 
also required, in the view of the Crown, that there be independent ownership. In the view o f the 
defence it was sufficient that there be independent editorial and publishing operation which, it was 
argued, was quite consistent with common ownership.
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In the Trial Court, Robichaud J. observed that “The uniqueness of 
the instant cases places me on the very threshold of a previously 
unopened door in our Canadian jurisprudence”.23 Turning to American 
cases, he quoted from Black J.:
. . . the widest possible dissemination o f  information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare o f  the public, that a free press 
is a condition o f  a free society.24
and from Frankfurter J.:
. . . the incidence o f  restraints upon the promotion o f  truth through denial o f  
access to the basis for understanding calls into play considerations very 
different from comparable restraints in a cooperative enterprise having 
merely a commercial aspect.25
In his conclusion that the Combines Investigation Act did apply to the 
daily newspaper business, Robichaud J. found helpful the remarks of 
Ferguson J.:
T he daily newspaper business . . . has sufficient peculiar characteristics and 
uses which make it distinguishable from all other products . . . Daily 
newspapers have a unique market for which there is no real 
substitute. . . T he daily newspaper provides a cluster o f  services in one  
unique package. . . T hey provide more, wider and deeper coverage o f  all 
news — international, national and local — than any other medium o f  daily 
news dissemination.28
T hat the once dom inant position of the newspaper as a source of 
information had been weakened by the development o f radio and 
television was recognized. Expert evidence to this effect was accepted by 
the court, being referred to as a “recital of what everyone knows: That 
the advent of radio and television has provided keen competition with 
the newspapers, in dissemination of news and in advertising, all over the 
world”.27 The formerly “exclusive territory” of the press had been 
invaded by radio and television.
Nevertheless, journalism or the press still remains, in my view, a most 
important cog in the machinery o f  properly informing the public, the citizens 
o f  our Province and o f  our country as a whole, and so contributing a basis for 
the formation o f their opinions. T he “Press” still mans the front line in the 
bastion o f  our liberties and civil rights.28
” (1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45, at 62 (N.B.S.C.).
u lbid., at 63; the quotation is from the judgm ent of the Supreme Court o f the United Slates in the 
Associated Press case, 1945.
u IbuL, at 63; the quotation is also from the Associated Press case, from a concurring opinion.
**Ibid, at 63, 64; the quotation is from the judgm ent o f the U.S. District Court for the Central District o f 
California in the Times Mirror case (1967).
” IbuL, at 68.
“I bid , at 68.
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Robichaud J. at a later point in his judgm ent quoted from the 
Crown submission, with evident approval:
. . . the effect o f  restraints on competition in the daily newspaper field are so 
important from the point o f  view o f  freedom o f  the press that they are one o f  
the main heads o f  detriment that must be considered by the Court.29
In so concluding, the judge necessarily rejected the defence 
position, stating that he could not subscribe to the submission “that in 
charges under the Combines Act the Courts are concerned with 
Economics, that is, pricing, and not with such matters as dissemination of 
ideas, news and comments”.30
The argum ent o f the Crown was that, given the complete control of 
the English-language daily newspaper business in New Brunswick 
enjoyed by K. C. Irving Ltd. “actual detriment does exist in that the very 
foundation o f our democratic system is imperilled”. “It is the intellectual 
competition among independent newspapers which must be regarded as 
detrimental in its absence”.31 Mr. Justice Robichaud indicated his 
acceptance o f the Crown’s approach to detriment as exemplified by the 
above-quoted statement.
However, despite the existence of “actual detrim ent”, as alleged by 
the Crown, and accepted by the Court, the finding was that
the owners o f  the acquiring company . . . have never exercised any control or 
direction in the gathering and publication o f  news and have always left total 
editorial independence to the publishers and editors o f the five 
English-language daily newspapers in New Brunswick.32
T here appears to be no necessary contradiction between this finding 
of fact — complete editorial autonomy — and the finding of actual 
detrim ent — “the very foundation of our democratic system is 
imperilled”. The foundation can be “imperilled”, and this can be 
considered an actual — rather than a potential detriment — even 
though, as in this case, no evidence of any detrimental restraint upon 
editorial autonomy was available.
In his verdict, Robichaud J., in effect, ignored the very question to 
which his judgm ent devoted a great deal of discussion. By the 
application o f the jurisprudence developed in cases involving allegations 
o f an undue limitation of competition, the question can be answered 
quite apart from any particular public interest in competition in the 
newspaper field. The question is: has the line that separates a “due”
"Ibid., at 100.
*°lbuL, at 99.
slCase on Appeal, Vol. XVI, at 2902.
3*( 1974), 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45, at 88 (N.B.S.C.).
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from an “undue” limitation of competition been crossed? If the answer 
is “yes”, as Robichaud J. determined, then the monopoly or merger has 
been a source o f public detriment.
In my view, once a complete monopoly has been established, su J i as the 
evidence clearly discloses, inasmuch as the post-1960 charges are concerned, 
detriment, in law, resulted.
As for the pre-1960 charges . . . did this not constitute a “virtual monopoly” o f  
the English-language newspapers o f  New Brunswick? I think so.33
Guilt was, accordingly, established and Robichaud J. so concluded. 
And, as the case proceeded through the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court of Canada the key question became: Had the trial judge 
been correct in relying on the jurisprudence relating to “unduly”, in the 
conspiracy cases, to arrive at the meaning to be assigned to the phrase 
“to the detrim ent of the public” in a monopoly/merger case?
Hence, although Mr. Justice Robichaud’s judgment confirms the 
importance o f a free press in a democratic society, and therefore 
confirms the particular importance of competition in the newspaper 
industry, and although he accepted the Crown’s submission that actual 
detrim ent was produced by the monopoly control o f daily newspapers in 
New Brunswick, Justice Robichaud’s judgm ent is not dependent upon 
any such importance.
The nature of the commodity in question — so much discussed in 
the judgm ent, and so much considered in the evidence presented — 
faded from view; the public interest aspect o f the case (i.e. is it in the 
public interest that all five English-language daily newspapers in the 
Province of New Brunswick be under single ownership?) was replaced by 
the purely legal aspect (i.e. has the acquisition of these newspapers 
produced a crossing of the line that separates the “due” from the 
“undue”, thereby being illegal and is this the correct approach to 
illegality in a monopoly/merger charge?). This is not surprising. 
Although the legislation makes use of the concept of “the interest of the 
public” the court is not a tribunal to determine what is in the public 
interest. It is the task o f the court to determine, as a matter of law, 
whether or not a specified offence has been committed.
THE COURT OF APPEAL’S DECISION
Given the basis of the Trial C ourt’s decision, the question of the 
peculiar public interest attaching to competition in the newspaper 
industry did not loom large in the reasoning o f either the Appeal 
Division of the New Brunswick Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Nevertheless, both judgm ents included observations relevant to
33lbtd., at 101.
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the concern o f this article, so that a brief consideration of these 
judgm ents seems worthwhile.
At an early point in the judgm ent o f the Appeal Division, Limerick 
J., writing on behalf o f a unanimous court, had this to say:
". . .  it is not contended, i f  the question o f  editorial com ment, editing o f  news 
and suppression o f  news are matters to be considered in determ ining whether 
it be deem ed to be ‘to the detriment or against the interest o f  the public. . 
that there has been a detriment to the public or against the interest o f  the 
public in that respect’’.34
It was, o f course, so contended by the Crown. The Crown had 
argued that “actual detriment does exist in that the very foundation of 
our democratic system is imperilled” and the Trial Court had accepted 
the Crown’s approach. The issue is, in part, semantic. The Trial Court 
had concluded that there had not been the centralized control, and 
restriction on editorial independence, seen by the Crown as the danger 
to the public interest inherent in the situation. It is undoubtedly this 
aspect of the Trial Court’s judgm ent that Limerick J. is referring to. In 
that sense, it could be said that there had been no actual detriment, i.e., 
no specific instances of detrimental behaviour involving editorial or news 
policy. The position of the Crown could thus be described either as a 
concern with potential detrim ent resulting from the power to control or 
as an actual detrim ent produced by the creation of the (as yet 
unexercised) power to control.
The judgment o f the Court of Appeal goes on to differentiate 
between the newspaper as a physical object and the contents thereof.
A distinction . . . m i/t  be made between the physical object, the newspapei 
consisting o f  a number o f  pages o f  newsprint, and the contents thereof such 
as the editorials, news items and other subject-matters and viewpoints 
expressed in the newspaper . . . T he Combines Investigation Act, however, when 
read as a whole applies to commercial transactions, trade and commerce, the 
buying and selling o f  such articles as newspapers, paper plates, or any other 
commodity.35
The judgm ent continues:
It [the Combines Investigation A ct] does not Und was not intended to control or 
restrict the expression o f  ideas, editorial comment, or editing o f  news.3®
S4(1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157, at 164 (N.B.S.C., A.D.). (Italics supplied).
3ilbid., at 167. On this point, the Crown’s factum to the Supreme Court had this to say: *'A newspaper is 
a newspaper not because it consists o f a num ber of sheets of newsprint, but because it does contain 
editorials, news items and other subject matters and view points. These are the attributes likely to be 
affected most by competition or the lack of it. Conversely the effects o f competition cannot be appraised 
properly if the effects in these areas are not considered”. In the Supreme Court o f Canada. On Appeal 
From the Court o f Appeal In the Province o f New Brunswick. Appellant’s Factum, (para. 25), at 20.
»•(1976), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157 at 167.
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It is difficult to attach meaning to this statement as there was no 
suggestion that the Act was “intended to control or restrict the 
expression o f ideas”. It was the argum ent of the Crown that the benefits 
o f competition, to which the public was entitled, included in this case the 
free flow of ideas, editorial comment and news, so that a possible 
restriction on such a free flow was a legitimate concern as an ingredient 
of the public interest.
One can, however, speculate on the intended meaning o f the quoted 
statement. It may mean that any restriction on the expression o f ideas, 
editorial comment, or editing o f news resulting from the common 
ownership o f the five English-language newspapers would not have been 
considered by the Court of Appeal as a source of detriment. Had the 
Crown, for example, established that a common editorial policy had 
been imposed — as, of course, it did not — or that specific news stories 
had been suppressed — as, again, it did not — then that would not have 
been evidence of detrim ent for purposes of the Combines Investigation Act. 
If that is what is meant, as appears reasonable, the further references in 
the judgm ent to the non-interventionist position taken by K. C. Irving, 
Ltd., with respect to editorial policy must be seen by the court as 
evidence relating to the question not o f detriment, but o f continuing 
competition in the industry.
In the light o f the statement that the Act was not intended to 
control or restrict the expression of ideas, editorial comment, or editing 
of news, if it has the meaning assigned to it in the above paragraph, it is 
particularly difficult to see the basis for the Court o f Appeal’s assertion 
that “if New Brunswick Publishing had discontinued distribution of the 
Moncton Times in the North Shore area or had agreed with the other 
companies charged to increase the price o f all newspapers unreasonably.
I would have no hesitation in finding those publishing companies' 
involved guilty of assisting in a monopoly which had operated to the 
detriment o f the public”.37 The attachment o f critical importance to the 
continued distribution of the Moncton Times in one area of the province 
seems hard to justify if the newspaper is, as suggested, no more than “a 
num ber of pages o f newsprint” no different from “paper plates or any 
other commodity”. It is, surely, the fact that a newspaper is more than 
simply a num ber of pages of newsprint, the fact that it contains 
“editorials, news items and other subject-matters and viewpoints” that 
would make its discontinuation detrimental to the public in a way in 
which the discontinuation of the distribution of paper plates, other 
paper plates remaining available, would not.
The Combines Investigation Act establishes no specific limitations 
applicable to the undefined concepts of public interest and detriment in 
the monopoly and m erger section. It seems not unreasonable to suggest 
that the phrase “detrim ent to the public” is, o r should be, elastic enough
3ilbid., at 167.
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to permit, in the case o f an alleged m erger or monopoly offence 
involving newspapers, a consideration o f those aspects o f the public 
interest to which a newspaper makes a particular contribution, a 
contribution recognized in the Trial Court. That being the case, matters 
relating to the expression of ideas, editorial comment and editing of 
news become relevant; the exclusion o f such matters seems an 
unwarranted confining o f the concept of the public interest within 
narrow bounds.
The judgment o f the Court of Appeal returns to this point again:
T he evidence disclosed no detriment to the public relating to the 
newspapers . . . even as to editorial policy if such can be considered as being 
included in the contemplation o f  what is detrimental to the public interest.''8
As a result, given the facts of the case, the interpretation o f 
detrim ent adopted by the Court o f Appeal is not critical. Had its concept 
o f detriment been broad enough to include those matters, such as 
editorial policy, excluded by the judgment, the decision would have been 
the same, there being no evidence o f any detrim ent of this sort.
In its Factum to the Supreme Court, the Crown placed considerable 
stress on the point with which this article is concerned, as is evident 
from the following quotations:
The Court o f  Appeal did not give effect to this evidence [of expert witnesses, 
concerning the danger o f  monopoly control o f  all English language daily 
newspapers in the Province o f  New Brunswick] because o f  its view that any 
detriment to the public arising out o f  interference with freedom of the press 
was outside the scope o f  the Combines Investigation Act. The Appellant submits 
that the Court o f  Appeal erred in law.
T he complete elimination o f competition, in the circumstances o f  these cases, 
deprived the public o f  access to a free and independent press. This deprivation, 
in and o f itself, was detrimental to the public in a particular way over and above arty
3*Ibid., at 169. Limerick J. proceeds to discuss the "evidence [which] discloses no detriment to the 
public . . . even as to editorial policy”. He notes that “editorials . . .  in direct conflict with each o ther” 
have been carried, (at 169). News items “unfavourable to K. C. Irving enterpries and editorials criticizing 
various Irving enterprises" have been carried, (at 169). This suggests the sort o f public detriment 
Limerick J. would consider relevant if editorial policy were "included in the contemplation o f what is 
detrimental to the public interest” a possibility he had earlier in the decision rejected. He had also 
commented on the slanting o f "editorials and news selection to coincide with what he [a publisher] 
thought the owner would want and particularly to avoid unfavourable reference to any other business 
enterprise operated by the newspaper owner”; he found no evidence of any such slanting, (at 168). He 
was impressed by the fact that publishers and editors "were to have absolute control over editorial p >licy 
without interference from the owner or the holding company”, (at 168). In this connection, it is 
interesting to note that in the Proceedings o f the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, No. 5, 
December 16th, 1969, Mr. K. C. Irving is reported to have been asked by Senator Prowse: “If you 
thought that any action he [the publisher] was taking would be inimitable to the interests of New 
Brunswick, you would step in?" Mr. Irving answered "Yes”. The publishers' “absolute control over 
editorial policy", as seen by Mr. Irving, apparently had limits; Mr. Irving was to be the arbiter of what 
was in the interest o f New Brunswick.
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consequence [s»c] which follow or are deemed in law to follow prevention or lessening of 
competition generally. 39
This passage indicates the way in which the Crown attempted to relate 
its emphasis on the legal detrim ent o f the reduction in competition with 
its concern for the particular importance to the public interest of the 
reduction in competition in this case. And further from the Crown’s 
Factum:
. . . the monopoly control over all English language daily newspapers 
published in the Province o f  New Brunswick which resulted from the 
elimination o f  competition, constituted such an interference with the freedom  
o f  the press that it necessarily operated and was likely to operate to the 
detriment o f  the public.
No two daily new spapers are the same. Each will reflect the views and policies 
o f  its owners as to what news is more important, what matters o f  public 
interest require comment, and the like. . . T he submission made here is that 
the reflection o f  independent points o f  view in news coverage and editorial 
comment is the most important manifestation o f  competition between or 
among newspapers.40
The defence might agree with the above statement, provided the word 
“owners” was replaced by the words “editors and publishers” whose 
actual independence was a large part o f the defence case.
T he Crown argued that in this case detriment to the public results because 
the public is deprived o f  having news selected and presented by independent 
publishers representing different points o f  view.41
At issue is the meaning of “independent”. It was the position o f the 
defence that, despite the fact of common ownership, the publishers were 
independent in that there was no imposition of centralized direction as 
to editorial policy or news content.
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
Laskin C.J., in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Supreme 
Court, wrote as follows:
Limerick, J. A. held . . . the legislation would not cover the contents [of a 
newspaper] as such. This is not a question that 1 need decide here and I leave 
it open, especially in view o f  the fact, established by the evidence, that
39In the Supreme Court of Canada. On Appeal From the Court of Appeal for the Province ot New 
Brunswick. Appellant's Factum. Para. 109, at 51, and Para. 105 at 49. (Italics supplied). It deserves to be 
noted that the Crown had requested leave to appeal on the ground: W hether the Court o f Appeal for 
New Brunswic k erred  in law in refusing to consider the importance of a free and independent press in
determ ining whether monopoly control o f newspapers operates or is likely to operate to the detriment 
of the public. This giound was not, however, one of those accepted by the Supreme Court.
*°lbid., Para. 94, at 44, and Para. 27, at 21.
*'lbtd., Para. 16, at 18.
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editorial control o f  the five newspapers was left in the hands o f  their 
respective publishers and editors without any attempt at central or other 
combined direction. At first blush, it seems incongruous that a prohibited 
merger or monopoly should not include newspapers in respect o f  their 
editorial direction, but, as I have said, I leave the point open.4*
He then summarizes, but does not comment upon, the Crown’s 
submission.
I do not overlook the Crown’s submission. . .  that because newspapers are 
important channels o f  communication in support o f  an informed public 
opinion and are important disseminators o f  ideas, and hence significant for a 
working democracy, they are so different from other commercial ventures as 
to require the Courts to view any alleged merger or monopoly in the 
newspaper field with greater concern for maintenance o f  freedom in the 
communication or dissemination o f  news and ideas.43
He then states that “it will be more convenient to deal with it [this 
view in the Crown’s submission] when I come to consider that 
submission.44
Regrettably, when in his concluding paragraph, Laskin C.J. returns, 
as promised, to the question, he does so only briefly. Referring to the 
need to establish operation or likely operation to the detriment of the 
public in a “merger, trust, or monopoly” charge under the previous 
(pre-1960) legislation or to a monopoly charge under the present Act, the 
Chief Justice states:
True enough, there was testimony taken from witnesses, referred to as expert 
witnesses by the trial Judge, who spoke o f  the threat to newspaper 
independence (and likely resulting public detriment) where there was 
centralized ownership o f  a number o f  newspapers with a right to control their 
policies in both editorial views and news reporting. They spoke theoretically, 
without having made any study o f  the situation in New Brunswick, nor did 
they address themselves to the facts relating to the operation o f the 
newspapers involved in the present case.45
These remarks, including, as they do, the phrase “they spoke 
theoretically” indicate the minimal weight to be attached to theoretical 
evidence, and hence the minimal weight also to be attached to any 
detriment, also necessarily theoretical, based on such evidence. The 
Chief Justice does not come to grips with the concept of detriment as 
urged by the Crown, over and above the detrim ent alleged to reside in 
the lessening of competition as such. As a result the fundamental public 
interest question raised by the case is not effectively answered by the 
Supreme Court.
4,(1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 1, at 5. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court's judgm ent chooses to leave 
this question open; an opinion on this would have been valuable, particularly if, in some future 
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EDITORIAL DIRECTION AND PUBLIC DETRIMENT
It is clear, then, that the issue o f detrim ent in the case o f a 
merger/monopoly charge involving newspapers has not been resolved. 
T he Trial Judge, while indicating his agreement with the proposition 
that newspapers perform  a function o f particular importance in a 
democratic society, so that special interest attaches to competition in the 
industry, based his verdict on his finding o f an undue lessening of 
competition unrelated to any particular properties a newspaper might 
have and therefore unrelated to any particular values that might be 
attached to competition in the newspaper industry. In the Court of 
Appeal the thrust o f the decision was to stress that the Combines 
Investigation Act applied to newspapers because they were a commodity 
subject to trade and commerce. Their peculiar information-providing 
function was treated as irrelevant. In the Supreme Court, the m atter was 
left open, though in such a way as to suggest that the Supreme Court 
found it difficult to see how the content o f newspapers, and hence their 
function, could sensibly be ignored in a Combines Investigation Act case. 
What the Supreme Court had in mind by the phrase “in respect of their 
editorial direction” (“it seems incongruous that a prohibited m erger or 
monopoly should not include newspapers in respect o f their editorial 
direction”) is not clear; the most reasonable interpretation is that 
“editorial direction” becomes relevant when the question o f public 
detrim ent arises. One would also be inclined to assume that the Court is 
suggesting “editorial direction” would be a component of public 
detrim ent if that editorial direction were centralized under common 
ownership. This assumption seems justified in that the judgm ent states 
that the question of whether the legislation covered the contents o f a 
newspaper as such need not be decided here, “especially in view of the 
fact. . . that editorial control of the five newspapers was left in the hands 
o f their respective publishers and editors without any attempt at central 
o r other combined direction”.46 The implication surely is that, had 
editorial control not been left in the hands o f the publishers and editors, 
the question of the applicability o f the Act to the contents of a 
newspaper could not have been shunted aside, and the issue of public 
detrim ent flowing from such centralized editorial control would have 
had to be faced.
What type or amount of editorial direction might constitute public 
detrim ent is not, understandably, made clear. And what sort o f evidence 
would be required to demonstrate editorial direction is also not made 
clear; one suspects that editorial direction can be imposed in more than 
one way, some less obvious (or more subtle) than others, some less likely 
to produce evidence satisfactory to a court than others. The very notion 
o f “editorial direction” lacks precision. Would a policy o f continuing 
editorial direction be necessary? Would a policy o f agreeing on the 
editorial line to be taken on certain major issues be sufficient? Would a
4tlbid., at 5. (Italics supplied).
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policy covering the treatment, whether in editorials or news, of 
particular matters such as other economic interests o f the owner be 
enough? Would it be sufficient to demonstrate, as the Crown attempted 
to do, that, due to centralized direction, in a num ber o f instances 
particular news items were not covered, o r were covered in a misleading 
way, or deliberately misinterpreted? In sum, there is little in the 
Supreme Court judgm ent to afford guidance on the central public 
interest issue with which the case was concerned: ‘under what conditions 
is the common ownership of all newspapers in a province detrimental to 
the public, given the judgm ent that such common ownership cannot, in 
and of itself, be said to involve that detrim ent which the Act is supposed 
to guard against?’. Expressed concisely, when would the operation of a 
newspaper, or newspapers, in a monopoly position be illegal, because of 
detrimental operation?
Of at least one thing we can be certain. The issues involved in the 
Irving case were unsuitable for determination under the Combines 
Investigation Act, in a criminal court, with the necessity to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The concept o f guilt in this case seems 
somehow inappropriate. The issue in the case was implicit in Crown 
Counsel’s opening statement to the court. Was it in the public interest 
that all five English-language daily newspapers in the Province o f New 
Brunswick be under common ownership? This fundamental question 
was made more acute by — though it was not really dependent upon — 
the position which that owner occupied in the New Brunswick economy. 
Yet this issue was, in effect, pushed aside. The Crown itself relied 
primarily on the legal proposition that, when competition had been 
lessened unduly, there was detriment to the public. The Crown did not, 
however, lose sight o f the nature of the detriment the public suffered 
when competition was unduly lessened in the newspaper industry. The 
trial Judge, as already noted, though impressed by the Crown’s 
argum ent concerning the role o f the press in a democratic society, did 
not rely on it in arriving at his decision, which would have been the 
same whatever the product involved. The Court o f Appeal rejected the 
thrust of the Crown’s case, finding that the Combines Investigation Act did 
not cover those matters which were seen by the Crown as critical to the 
nature o f the detriment that would flow from the absence of 
competition in the newspaper industry o f the province. The Supreme 
Court judgm ent found it unnecessary to tackle the issue. As a result the 
case was determined on a narrowly legal basis so that the real public 
interest issue was ignored. The system answered “no” to the following 
question; ‘Was there a violation o f the m erger or monopoly provisions of 
the Combines Investigation Act?’ The system did not provide an answer to 
the underlying public policy question: ‘Was it in the public interest that 
all five English language daily newspapers in the province o f New 
Brunswick be under common ownership?’. To an essentially irrelevant 
question: ‘Has the crime of assisting in the formation o f a merger or 
monopoly been committed?’ an answer was given. To the important
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question: ‘What should public policy be in this situation?’ no answer was 
provided, because the question was never asked.47
It does not appear that the m erger provisions o f Bill C-13, the latest 
attempt by the government to complete the reform of competition policy 
initiated in the late 1960’s, represent an improvement with respect to the 
treatment o f newspaper acquisitions. It is true that the proposal to have 
an expert Board, rather than a criminal court, deal with mergers would 
eliminate many of the procedural difficulties revealed in the Irving 
case.48 The m erger section of Bill C-13, however, contains no reference 
to the public interest or public detriment, so that arguments relating to 
the importance of the free flow of information from the point of view of 
the public interest, would evidently not be appropriate when the 
proposed Board applies the criteria established by C-13. The 
requirem ent that a merger “lessens, or is likely to lessen, substantially, 
actual or potential competition” if it is to be brought before the Board 
would remove from the possibility of examination some newspaper 
mergers to which a public interest was attached. It is, in fact, probable 
that the Board, had it been faced by the Irving acquisitions, would not 
have found that any lessening of competition resulting from the 
acquisitions, given the limited circulation overlap, could be considered 
“substantial”. In addition, the several criteria to be taken into account by 
Bill C-13’s proposed Board in reaching its judgm ent do not include 
those matters likely to be important in a newspaper case.
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S POLICY
Brief mention may be made o f the approach of the United Kingdom to 
newspaper mergers. A recognition of the particular importance of 
competition in the newspaper industry has resulted in a policy to deal 
with newspaper mergers separate from that dealing with mergers 
generally. Stated simply, a newspaper is not to be transferred to the 
owner of another newspaper without the consent of the Minister, and 
this consent will be given, except in certain specified cases, only after the 
proposed merger has been referred to a specially constituted group of 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, for a public interest 
assessment. The Commission is directed to determine whether:
the transfer may be expected to operate against the public interest, taking
into account all matters which appear in the circumstances to be relevant and,
47It is regrettable — though there may well have been some very g<x>d reason — that the Irving case 
was not referred to the Restrictive T rade Practices Commission for a public interest assessment. It was a 
situation in which the public interest issues were sufficiently important that an assessment by the 
Commission would seem to have been of value.
4*Bill C-13. An Act to amend the Combines Investigation Act and to amend the Bank Act and other Acts in 
relation thereto or in consequence theeof. First reading, November 18, 1977. Third Session, Thirtieth 
Parliament, 26 Elizabeth II, 1977. The m erger provisions are contained in Sec. 31.71 It is probably safe 
to assume that, if the present Act does get revised and passed, which is far from certain, the merger 
provisions will not differ fundamentally from those proposed in C-13. C-13, in fact, died on the order 
paper. Suggestions that it will again be introduced, suitably revised, continue to be heard.
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in particular, the need for accurate presentation o f  news and free expression 
o f  opinion.48
A leading commentator on competition law in the United Kingdom 
has discussed the policy with respect to newspaper mergers as follows:
Newspapers — sufficient newspapers to represent most o f  the widely held 
political approaches — are so important in a democracy that it has been made 
illegal to transfer a paper to the owner o f  others without the prior consent o f  
the Minister . .  . Where a newspaper cannot survive, a merger with another 
paper may be the kindest way o f  ending its life. . . But where a paper might 
have continued, the concentration by merger o f  the organs for influencing 
public opinion is damaging. Consequently, the requirements for a press 
merger are more stringent than for others.50
It is to be particularly noted that, unlike the Irving case which 
concerned completed mergers, one in 1948, one in 1968, in the United 
Kingdom it is the merger proposal that is referred to the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission, so that a m erger that does not satisfy the 
Commission’s concept of what the public interest requires will be 
prevented from taking place. This procedure also permits mergers to go 
ahead on the strength of conditions agreed to by the acquiring 
newspaper owner, conditions which bring the proposed m erger within 
the confines of the public interest.
As far as the question of treating newspapers differently from the 
products of other industries is concerned, the United Kingdom’s Royal 
Commission on the Press had the following to say (after recommending 
a Press Amalgamation Court):
Then it may be said —  and said truly —  that the proposal involves treating 
the newspaper industry differently from industry in general. T he answer is 
that the public interest in relation to the newspaper industry is different. T he  
discrimination is based on the proposition that freedom and variety in the 
expression o f  opinion and presentation o f  news is an element which does not 
enter into the conduct o f  other competitive industries and that it is a 
paramount public interest.51
4*This is a direct quotation from The Fair Tradmg Act, 1973. See Korah, Valentine, Competition Law of 
Bntain and the Common Market, Paul Elek, London, 1975, at 76.
solbtd., at 72-73.
*'Roya] Commission on T he Press 1961-62 Report, September 1962, London, HMSO, Cmnd. 1811, at 
106. T he recommended Court was not, in fact, established. When legislation to deal with mergers was 
enacted m 1965, however, newspaper mergers were given special treatment and specific criteria. And it 
may be noted that, in Canada the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media recommended a Press 
Ownership Review Board. “We urge the government to establish a Press Ownership Review Board with 
powers to approve or disapprove mergers between, or acquisitions of, newspapers and periodicals”. 
Note also the burden of proof suggested by the Senate Committee ("all transactions that increase 
concentration o f ownership in he mass media are undesirable and contrary to the public interest — 
unless shown to be otherwise”), and consider the burden of proof placed on the Crown in a Combines 
Investigation Act case: to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. T he Senate Committee went on to ask 
the question: “Suppose K. C. Irving wished to buy the last remaining independent newspaper in New 
Brunswick. . . It seems almost unarguable that the state should be empowered to watch over the public 
interest if any such transactions were proposed”. "The Uncertain Mirror” Report o f the Special Senate 
Committee on Mass Media Volume I, Queen’s Printer for Canada, Ottawa, 1970, at 73. As the Report 
had already noted, at 26, that K. C. Irving owned all five o f the province's English language dailies, the 
“last remaining independent newspaper” must be rEvangeltne, a French-language paper.
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SUMMARY
A num ber o f points summarizing key aspects of the Irving case may 
now be made.
1. The Supreme Court decision, as stated in the Director’s Annual 
Report, appears52 to demonstrate the inability to deal with the 
merger problem under the present legislation. If the govern­
ment feels that there should be a policy to deal effectively with 
mergers — a doubtful assumption perhaps — an early passage 
of revised legislation capable of coping with the merger problem 
may be confidently predicted.
2. The Irving case reveals the problems inherent in an Act which — 
at least in the merger section — must translate a public interest 
problem into a “competition” problem. In view of the finding by 
the Court of Appeal that the acquisition of the Fredericton Daily 
Gleaner in 1968 had not resulted in a lessening o f competition, 
the alleged illegality attaching to that acquisition was necesssarily 
denied, given the wording o f the Act. This does not, however, 
eliminate the public interest in the acquisition nor does it, in this 
case, remove all concern that there might be public detriment. 
The public interest in changes in press ownership is not confined 
to changes that reduce competition, i.e., to acquisition of 
newspapers competitive with papers already owned by the 
acquirer.53 Hence, even if it were agreed that the Fredericton 
Daily Gleaner had not been competitive despite an overlapping 
circulation with the Saint John Telegraph Journal, there would 
seem to be a public interest in the preservation of an entirely 
independent newspaper in the province. The finding by the 
Court o f Appeal that there had been no lessening of competition
“ "Appears" is used for the following reason, already alluded to in footnote 4. The m erger charge based 
on the present Act necessarily failed given the Finding by the Court o f Appeal that there had been no 
lessening of competition as a result o f the acquisitions, including the acquisition of the Fredericton Daily 
Gleaner in 1968. As a merger, to be illegal, must lessen competition, o r be likely to lessen competition, 
the acquisition o f the Daily Gleaner did not even meet this requirement for illegality, so that the question 
of whether o r not the lessening was to the detrim ent o f the public did not arise. That being so, it may 
be suggested that the reasoning behind the decision is applicable only to future cases in which there is 
no lessening of competition — it is hard to think that there would be any such cases — so that the 
interpretation o f the phrase "to the detriment of the public" in a case involving an actual lessening of 
competition has not yet been determined.
” A report by the United Kingdom’s Monopolies Commission on a proposed newspaper merger makes 
this point effectively: ’T h e  special risk arising from concentration lies rather in the fact that, if the 
owner o f a wide-ranging group were to use whatever power in this respect his ownership gave him so as 
to prevent accurate presentation of news or free expression of opinion, or were he, indeed, to abuse 
this power in any other way, the damage would be much greater because o f the area over which the 
harmful effects would be sustained. There is a further risk in that, while there may be little in the way 
of direct competition in the production of local newspapers, the absence of independent papers uithm  a 
region makes it difFicult for comparisons to be made and easier for standards o f efFiciency to deteriorate 
through complacency”. (Italics supplied). The Monopolies Commission, George Outram (J  Company Ltd. and 
Hamilton Advertiser L td  and Baird fcf Hamilton Ltd. A report on the proposed transfer o f six weekly 
newspapers, 20th January, 1970. London, HMSO, at 21-22.
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flowing from the Irving acquisitions may or may not have been 
correct. The Crown’s appeal to the Supreme Court included the 
ground that the Court of Appeal had erred in “holding that 
subsidiaries o f a parent corporation may be in competition with 
each other”54. This important point was not dealt with directly in 
the Supreme C ourt’s decision. In accepting the Court of 
Appeal’s finding the “pre-existing competition. . . remained and 
was to some degree intensified”55 the Supreme Court implicitly 
denied the Crown’s argument and accepted the possibility that 
subsidiaries o f a common owner could in fact compete one with 
the other. Given the Act, specifically the post-1960 merger 
provision, the finding was crucial as far as the legality o f the 
merger was concerned but not, it is suggested, of overriding 
significance as far as the public interest aspect was concerned.
3. Given that the legislation is criminal law, the public interest 
issues were shunted aside in favour o f a sterile argum ent — 
sterile from the public policy point of view — of the 
interpretation which, on the basis o f past decisions, was to be 
given to the phrase “to the detriment of the public”. It seems 
fair to conclude that a study of the Irving case supports the 
criticism made by many commentators on the Combines 
Investigation Act: the procedures o f a criminal court, the 
adversary system, and the constraint imposed by the obligation 
to apply the reasoning of past decisions in comparable cases, 
makes criminal law a totally inappropriate method for reaching a 
balanced judgm ent as to where the public interest lies. It is, 
however, such a balanced judgm ent that a sensible m erger policy 
requires.
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